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OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: IS IT A PANACEA?

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- -preconceived ideas.
- -overconfidence.
- -desire for certainty.
 -"wolf" theory.
- -systemic and intrinsic problems of intelligence system.

The study concludes that there is an interrelationship among the shortcomings and that if one shortcoming is allowed to manifest itself then another normally follows. When operational intelligence is high in quality and adequate in the amount of detail required, the commander has greater freedom of action in his planning spectrum. Operational intelligence can allow the commander to increase his agility and synchronization, take full advantage of his depth, and allow initiative to be on his side.

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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: IS IT A PANACEA by MAJ Ronald L. Burgess, USA, 42 pages.

This study investigates the question that if valid operational intelligence is available, are there reasons or factors that preclude it from contributing to or providing operational success? Case studies utilizing intelligence indicators from Pearl Harbor, Midway, and the Battle of the Ardennes are cited for use in the study. Doctrinal requirements from FM 34-1, <u>Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations</u>, and FM 100-5, <u>Operations</u>, form the basis for the study.

The study concludes that operational intelligence indicators were present in all three case studies. The paper presents the case that while Midway is considered an intelligence success and Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes an intelligence failure, the intelligence indicators were present in all three to varying degrees and therefore intelligence should have contributed to operational success.

The study identifies six shortcomings that were present and caused the intelligence indicators not to be acted upon. These shortcomings are:

- -too much intelligence or the "noise" theory.
- -preconceived ideas.
- -overconfidence.
- -desire for certainty.
- -"wolf" theory.
- -systemic and intrinsic problems of intelligence system.

The study concludes that there is an interrelationship among the short-comings and that if one shortcoming is allowed to manifest itself then another normally follows. When operational intelligence is high in quality and adequate in the amount of detail required, the commander has greater freedom of action in his planning spectrum. Operational intelligence can allow the commander to increase his agility and synchronization, take full advantage of his depth, and allow initiative to be on his side.

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I. INTRODUCTION

For the past few years the Army has tried to understand the concept of operational art. Our current doctrine attempts to inculcate the theory and doctrine of operational art in our latest publications so that the seed of a "common cultural bias" may be planted in the ranks. "Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations...Operational art thus involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle. Its essence is the identification of the enemy's operational center of gravity-his source of strength or balance-and the concentration of superior combat power against that point to achieve a decisive success....Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends, and effective joint and combined cooperation. 1 In simple terms operational art is the determining of when, where, and for what immediate purpose large formations will clash. It is the nexus between the strategic aim or aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield, whether that battlefield be on the ground, in the air, or on the sea.

The doctrine and the concept of operational art suggests that operational intelligence exists which can support the concept. The idea that operational intelligence is a separate entity and should be addressed differently from strategic and tactical intelligence has gained momentum in the last year.

¹ U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (1986), p. 10.

While various authors have attempted to define the characteristics and requirements of operational intelligence, the analysis of perceived operational intelligence failures has been left to historians and students. Are we to accept Handel's assertion that "historical experience confirms that intelligence failures were more often caused by a breakdown on the level of acceptance than on the acquisition or analysis levels."²

If one accepts that operational level planning and decisionmaking requires operational intelligence to bring the commander closer to that illusive abstract variable, certainty, then what are the reasons that valid operational intelligence either contributes or does not contribute to operational success? Clauswitz posed the question best, "If we consider the actual basis of this information, how unreliable and transient it is, we soon realize that war is a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruins. The textbooks agree, of course, that we should only believe reliable intelligence, and should never cease to be suspicious, but what is the use of such feeble maxims?...Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain." However, what factors cause intelligence to be ignored or discarded? One assumes that if accurate intelligence at the operational level is ignored, this will directly impact upon the validity of a chosen course of action and that there will be serious repercussions; and certainly there must be more concrete reasons for this than the generalizations postulated by Clauswitz.

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether if valid operational intelligence is available, there are reasons or factors that preclude it from

Roy Godson, ed., <u>Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates</u> (Washington, 1980), p. 98.

³ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Micheal Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), p. 117.

contributing to or providing operational success. Intelligence regarding the enemy at all levels has long been recognized as necessary and as a contributor to success on the battlefield. Sun Tzu, a military theorist of 500 B.C. recognized its importance and it is interesting to note that even before this time the importance of intelligence was identified by Joshua, of the Old Testament Bible, in 1400 B.C. during the conduct of his Central Campaign in the Promised Land.⁴ This paper will attempt to assess why valid operational intelligence did or did not contribute to the operational success within a theater of operations.

The methodology used will be to examine current doctrine and operational intelligence as it relates to strategic and tactical intelligence while defining requirements that may be peculiar to operational intelligence. The author will use historical examples to provide the framework for an operational intelligence case study that will establish the basis for analysis. The analysis will compare and contrast the availability and utilization of operational intelligence, determine whether the operations were affected by the availability or non-availability of operational intelligence, and, if so, why operational intelligence did or did not contribute to the operational success of the operation. The paper will conclude by offering some concepts applicable to current and future operational techniques.

The study will contribute to a better understanding of why operational intelligence, even when valid, does not contribute to success and identify some reasons or factors which need to be considered if operational intelli-

In Sun Tzu's writings, The Art of War, he discusses the importance and requirement regarding "foreknowledge" and states that it is a prerequisite for victory. In the first two chapters of Joshua found in The Bible Joshua describes how he used humint intelligence sources to assist him in the conquering of the Promised Land in what has come to be referred to as the Central Campaign.

gence is to play the role required of it by doctrine. These factors, if not addressed in the future, could well spell the difference between success and failure at the operational level.

II. Current Doctrine and a Review of the Doctrinal Literature

While it is not the purpose here to define and set the parameters of operational intelligence, an understanding of doctrinal perceptions, interaction with other levels of intelligence and any specific requirements peculiar to the utility of operational intelligence should be understood before undertaking a historical military analysis.

Current doctrinal publications attempt to define operational intelligence, however; as this discussion will show, the "audit trail" through these publications is not clear regarding operational intelligence. JCS recognizes that intelligence exists as either strategic, operational, tactical, or combat and defines operational intelligence as "intelligence required for planning and executing all types of operations." While it is accepted that doctrine is a condensed expression of an army's approach to fighting, this definition appears to lack an exactness that would enhance its utility.

While FM 100-5, *Operations* does not define operational intelligence, the following extended extraction from the manual suggests the parameters as viewed by the Army in the context of campaign planning:

"Units with operational responsibilities perform intelligence operations and analyses for the campaign, its major operations, as well as its battles. These actions take a larger view of the theater and of the enemy. They are oriented on large enemy units, to include air and naval formations, and units with

⁵ U.S., The Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Department of Defense Dictionary of Military</u> and <u>Associated Terms</u>, JCS Pub. 1 (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1984).

specialized operational capabilities. They cover the entire theater of operations, its airspace as well as contiguous waters.

As in tactical level analysis, numbers, types, mobility, morale, and equipment of enemy forces are considered. Additionally, operational level commanders take into account the enemy's doctrine and patterns of large unit operations, the personalities and idiosyncrasies of his senior commanders, and his air and naval capabilities. Campaign planners also review the influences of alliances on enemy courses of actions, the differences in quality and capabilities of troops of different nationalities, the attitudes of the civilian population in areas controlled by the enemy, and the enemy's dependence on external support and particular facilities. Finally, they advise the commander on the enemy's capacity for and vulnerability to nuclear or chemical weapons, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations.

Most important, because of the scope and duration of campaigns and major operations, and the consequently broad range of enemy options, operational intelligence must attempt to probe the mind of the enemy commander. It must see the theater through his eyes, visualize which courses of action are open to him, and estimate which he is most likely to adopt.

Operational considerations of terrain also differ. Most theaters of operations are separated from others by considerable distances or major physical features such as mountain ranges, large rivers, or even oceans. Terrain within a theater possesses an inherent geological structure which aids operational analysis. River valleys or basins, plateaus, river deltas, peninsulas, mountain or highland regions, plains, and islands all have operational significance. And facilities important to movement, air support, and combat service support-ports, highways, rail lines, and sources of food, fuel, and water-will affect the operations of both combatants.

Large unit commanders and their staffs must be able to visualize the theater of operations in the rough terms of localities. The intelligence estimate must set those localities in their proper relationship to permit the commander to direct operations far beyond his field of view and to plan well into the future.

In preparing the campaign intelligence estimate, staff officers make use of the reconnaissance and surveillance assets of all services, allies, and national agencies. They also use all available human sources from agents to guerrillas and long-range reconnaissance units and the meteorological and geographical references

on the area. 6

It is evident that the writers of FM 100-5 viewed operational intelligence as having a distinct application of its own. Not only does FM 100-5 account for a myriad of operations, as does the JCS definition, but also includes thoughts on enemy quality and quantity, the enemy commander, terrain, and utilization of all available assets. In addition, FM 100-5 discusses what is probably the key attribute or requirement for operational intelligence; that the intelligence provided must allow the commander to "plan well into the future."

It is interesting to note that the capstone Army manual for intelligence, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Final Draft), while recognizing the existence of operational intelligence, never attempts a definition although it defines tactical and strategic intelligence. It does however provide insight into how operational intelligence is perceived by the intelligence community. The following excerpt best illustrates this:

"The integration of tactical and strategic intelligence supports the planning and conduct of the operational level of war. The level at which this operational art and integration of intelligence occurs will vary with the size of the conflict and theater of operations...This operational level of war requires the vision to look beyond battles to plan and execute campaigns. The intelligence to support these campaigns must focus on identifying vulnerabilities in the enemy's plan, operational deployment, or support base which may be exploited in a successful sequence of battles to achieve our operational goals. This intelligence at the operational level must be predictive, anticipating future movement and objectives of the enemy in response to the changing battlefield. The production of intelligence in support of campaigns seldom results from collection specifically aimed at producing operational intelligence. It is the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence as well as integration of intelligence. produced by other components of joint or combined forces

⁶ U.S. Army, FM 100-5, <u>Operations</u> (1986), pp. 29-30.

which provide the detail in sufficient depth of the battlefield to plan and execute operational campaigns. 7

In all fairness, the intelligence community has attempted to correct this shortfall in doctrine in the last six months. The United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) recently proposed that operational intelligence be defined as, "that intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of campaigns within a theater of war. At the operational level of war, intelligence concentrates on the collection, identification, location, and analysis of strategic and operational centers of gravity that if successfully attacked, will achieve friendly political and military-strategic objectives within a theater of war. "8 This provides a valid, concise, first-attempt at defining operational intelligence and will be discussed further at the end of this section.

After defining the term, it is now necessary to see how operational intelligence is related to tactical and strategic intelligence and if there are areas where it differs. The relationship between the three types of intelligence and the interface between each is best exemplified by the following extraction from FM 34-1 when it states:

"However, all types of intelligence are used throughout the command structure. Strategic intelligence contributes to tactical and operational intelligence needs to conduct close and deep operations. Tactical intelligence, reported to successively higher levels, forms part of the input needed to satisfy operational and strategic intelligence requirements." 9

⁷ U.S. Army, FM 34-1, <u>Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations</u> (Final Draft) (1986), pp. 2-14 and 2-15.

³ Cpt Larry V. Buel, "Intelligence At The Operational Level Of War: Operational -Level Of War Intelligence Preparation Of The Battlefield" (unpublished talking paper, 1986), p. 7.

⁹ U.S. Army, FM 34-1, <u>Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations</u> (Final Draft) (1986), p. 2-13.

Doctrine states that tactical and strategic interface will occur at Echelons Above Corps (EAC) and corps. The figure shown at Appendix A represents this relationship. Thus, it appears from doctrinal publications that operational intelligence is more or less the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence to respond to operational requirements. To the intelligence community this nexus becomes operational intelligence.

Having defined operational intelligence this paper will now focus on whether operational intelligence has its own particular requirements or functions.

One of the first authors to publish in the public domain on the concept of operational art during its renaissance in the early 80's was Edward Luttwak. In one of his original treatises on the subject of operational art he identified one of the basic requirements of operational intelligence when he stated, "The vulnerability of relational maneuver methods to catastrophic failure reflects their dependence on the practise application of effort against correctly identified points of weakness....Somewhat loosely, one may characterize attrition methods as resource-based and relational-maneuver methods as knowledge-dependent." Luttwak has struck at the essence of our current maneuver doctrine and our assimilation of the operational art. Intelligence is the keystone to successful execution of an operational art utilizing maneuver doctrine.

Army doctrine goes on to delineate intelligence requirements that span the spectrum of intelligence when FM 100-5 discusses the imperative in Air-Land Battle of anticipating events on the battlefield. This imperative con-

¹⁰ Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level Of War", International Security, Winter 1980/81, p. 65. The italics in the quote were placed by the original author.

tains a key requirement for operational intelligence which is not found in other doctrinal publications. FM 100-5 states:

The commander must anticipate the enemy's actions and reactions and must be able to foresee how operations may develop. Predictions about the enemy and even our own troops can never be relied on with certainty, but it is nevertheless essential to anticipate what is possible and likely and prepare for those possibilities. Anticipating events and foreseeing the shape of possibilities hours, days, or weeks in the future are two of the most difficult skills to develop, yet among the most important. They require wisdom, experience, and understanding of the enemy's methods, capabilities, and inclinations, outstanding intelligence, and confidence in the knowledge of how one's own forces will perform. Anticipation and foresight are critical to turning inside the enemy's decision cycle and maintaining the initiative." 11

However, the requirements heretofore had to be extrapolated from these writings to be of any use. Army doctrine, being what it is, will normally attempt to fill this informational void with a more prescriptive approach to the question of operational intelligence requirements and functions.

FM 34-1 states that intelligence, the level not defined, has four major functions:

- -situation development
- -target development
- -electronic warfare
- -counter-intelligence (security and deception)

For the operational level of war a fifth function has been added-indications and warning. 12 If a function is present then it must follow that require-

¹¹ U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (1986), p. 23.

¹² CPT Larry V. Buel, "Intelligence At The Operational Level Of War: Operational-Level Of War Intelligence Preparation Of The Battlefield" (unpublished talking paper, 1986), p. 8.

ments exist for operational intelligence that do not apply to tactical or strategic intelligence, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. While the four functions of intelligence discussed earlier are present in current manuals and a matter of current professional training, the addition of the fifth function must be explained. Indications and warning require the intelligence system to develop and refine continuously regional or theater indicator lists which allow the commander's staff to note deviations in patterns of the enemy which allow the operational commander to anticipate and understand strategic actions which may lead to the exercising of a military solution. These deviations in patterns may fall within any political, military, economic, and diplomatic sphere or a combination thereof.

For the purpose of this paper the definition put forth by USAICS will be used. Operational intelligence, in concert with tactical and strategic intelligence, will be the intelligence required by a theater commander to accomplish his operational ends. The requirements, or functions, of operational intelligence are broad enough in scope to meet the parameters of this paper. While it is not in the context of this paper and fully meriting a study of its own, a comment must be made concerning the USAICS definition. Other literature referred to earlier delineated the requirement of operational intelligence to anticipate or forecast the enemy's actions, plans, and probable deployment in the future. While the USAICS definition is "on target" with its requirement to identify the enemy's center of gravity, the operational commander will have to sequence his battles and engagements to accomplish this goal. For this to happen operational intelligence must forecast based on current truth and assumptions so that the operational commander can set the terms of battle now to shape the campaign so that the enemy center of

gravity can be successfully attacked. This spirit is missing from the USAICS definition and that detracts from its usefulness.

III. Historical Review

Numerous historical case studies can be cited to demonstrate the application of operational intelligence and whether or not this intelligence contributed to operational success or failure. The following are some of the more notable examples where operational intelligence intelligence played an integral role in the outcome. Each case study will focus on the key intelligence indicators that were available before the initiation of the battle.

Pearl Harbor

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor clearly stands out as one of the primary examples of an alleged operational intelligence failure. However, a review of the current literature and the recent declassifying of the "MAGIC" intercept data show that numerous intelligence indicators were present which did alert the operational commanders to an impending attack.

Prior to the end of 1940 the primary indicators that were available and read by intelligence analysts were in the political realm. The U.S. and Japan began to move toward confrontation following the Japanese invasion of Manchukuo in 1931 with the U.S. placing progressively stricter boycotts and embargoes on the Japanese. Additionally, the Germans and the Russians signed a nonaggression pact that was followed by the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan. With the signing of a neutrality treaty between Ja-

pan and Russia on 13 April 1941 it became evident that Japan would be forced to look southward for vital resources. This region was to be the locale for the clash of U.S. and Japanese interests and ambitions.

In 1941 the thrust and pace of intelligence indicators accelerated toward certainty. As early as 27 January 1941 the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, relayed information that in the event of trouble between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese planned to make a surprise, mass attack on Pearl Harbor. This information had been obtained from the Peruvian Ambassador as well as a number of Japanese sources. 13 On 14 July 1941 Japanese officials in Canton sent a message to Tokyo which provided a clear picture that Japanese intentions were not peaceful, but that the Japanese were in fact prepared to go to war. 14

On 24 September 1941 a message from Tokyo was intercepted which directed the Japanese consulate in Honolulu to report on naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on a weekly basis. Later messages would be intercepted prior to the attack which would change this from a weekly report to one produced twice a week and then daily. 16

Perhaps the most telling intelligence indicator of a political nature presented itself to the operational intelligence analysts on 16 October 1941 when General Hideki Tojo became Prime Minister of Japan. He was elected

¹³ Hans L. Trefousse, <u>Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy</u> (Malabar, 1982), p. 24.

¹⁴ Gordon W. Prange, <u>At Dawn We Slept, The Untold Story Of Pearl Harbor</u> (New York, 1981), pp. 146-147.

¹⁵ Hans L. Trefousse, <u>Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy</u> (Malabar, 1982), p. 45.

¹⁶ Roberta Wohlstetter, <u>Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision</u> (Stanford, 1962), pp. 212-213.

because of his non-compromising stance towards the U.S. and upon election immediately formed a new, militant cabinet.¹⁷

Ambassador Grew followed up his information (presented in January) by cabling Washington twice in November 1941 that Japan might strike very suddenly in any direction and at any time. ¹⁸ During this same period intense negotiations were on-going in Washington between Japan and the U.S. concerning their strained relations. Additionally, the U.S. intercepted a diplomatic message telling the Japanese envoys that they must receive a reply to their "final" proposal by 29 November, but no later. ¹⁹

All of these political indicators culminated with the decryption of the famous Japanese 14-Part Message on 6 December which removed any doubt about Japanese intent. The subsequent mishandling of the message to Hawaii prior to the attack is not an intelligence issue, but a communications issue. The morning of 7 December a message was sent to Hawaii, but it was sent in a routine manner with no regard for time sensitivity. However, although Roosevelt believed war to be imminent, he, for some unexplained reason, did nothing to alert the military or the operational leaders at Pearl Harbor the night prior to the attack.²⁰

However, this plethora of operational intelligence indicators was not confined solely to the political realm. Other significant fragments of intelligence pointed to a Japanese attack when analyzed in conjunction with the political signals discussed earlier.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 231 & 284.

¹⁹ Department of Defense, The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor (Washington, 1978), V, p. 73.

²⁰ Hans L. Trefousse, <u>Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy</u> (Malabar, 1982), pp. 40-41.

An intelligence report received in Washington stated that a fleet of thirty to fifty Japanese ships had been sighted off Formosa. This was in addition to the fact that changes to the Japanese naval call signs were initiated on 1 November and 1 December, which was not part of their normal operating procedure. Furthermore, the Japanese Navy imposed radio silence at the end of November. Finally, on 6 December an intercepted message from Japanese agents in Honolulu stated that Pearl Harbor was ripe for a surprise attack. 23

The National Command Authority (NCA) and the operational commanders were sensitive to the intelligence indicators and accepted their validity to a point. On 16 October 1941 Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), warned Admiral Kimmel (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCUS) and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC)) that Japanese aggression was likely and told him to conduct preparatory deployments. This warning was reiterated more strongly to Kimmel on 24 November 1941. Additionally, on 27 November Roosevelt directed that the Hawaiian commanders be advised that further Japanese aggression was possible. On that day both the Army and the Navy sent messages to their respective commanders in Hawaii telling them to increase vigilance, reconnaissance, and any other

²¹ Roberta Wohlstetter, <u>Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision</u> (Stanford, 1962), p. 385.

Hans L. Trefousse, <u>Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy</u> (Malabar, 1982), p. 65.

²³ United States, <u>Pearl Harbor Attack 79th Congress Hearings</u> (Washington, 1946), p. 430.

²⁴ Roberta Wohlstetter, <u>Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision</u> (Stanford, 1962), pp. 132-133.

²⁵ Hans L. Trefousse, <u>Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy</u> (Malabar, 1982), p. 61.

²⁶ <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 35.

measures as they deemed appropriate to aid their defense.²⁷ The degree to which these warnings resulted in tactical/operational decisions is important but cannot be considered an intelligence failure when warnings go unheeded.

At 0753 on 7 December 1941 the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. See Appendix B for a chronological view from an intelligence perspective prior to the attack.

Midway .

The Battle of Midway often is referred to as the turning point of the war in the Pacific. If for no other reason than its being the first clear-cut American victory, it finally allowed American operational commanders to set the terms of battle with the Japanese. The official Army history summarizes it in this manner:

Though the decisive and far-reaching effects of the victory at Midway were not immediately apparent, it was clear that the Allies had temporarily gained the initiative in the Pacific. For the first time since the outbreak of war, they were in a favorable position to take the offensive.²⁸

Intelligence can be cited as being one of the primary contributors to the operational success achieved at Midway. The following encapsulates the intelligence indicators available to Admiral Nimitz, the operational commander for Midway.

In early May 1942 the commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and his staff believed that a major attack by the Japanese

Gordon W. Prange, <u>Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History</u> (New York, 1986), pp. 651-652.

²⁸ U. S. Army, <u>Strategy and Command</u>. <u>The First Two Years</u> (Washington, 1985), p. 289.

would soon be forthcoming on an unidentified Pacific base. However, they were unable to identify the location. Working for Admiral Nimitz, but under the control of the CNO, was a Commander Joseph Rochefort, chief of the Combat Intelligence Office (OP 20 02).²⁹ His office was primarily responsible for breaking the Japanese codes and ciphers, and while he knew that the potential target was identified by the Japanese code "AF", he was unable to dicipher it and pinpoint the location. Rochefort had an idea which involved manipulative communications deception. A message was sent to all potential target commanders instructing them to report on some distinctive problem which required the headquarter's attention. The commander at Midway complained of a faulty seawater distillation plant. On 10 May 1941 a radio intercept of a Japanese intelligence net reporting that "AF" had this problem confirmed the Japanese target.³⁰

Further cryptoanalytic intercepts on 14, 16 and 18 May 1942 confirmed that Midway and the Aleutians would be the targets and not Port Moresby. New Caledonia and Fiji, as the intelligence estimates originally surmised. 31

The operational intelligence picture became clearer on May 25 when the quest for certainty valued by commanders at all levels approached absolute. A message intercepted by detachments of Rochefort's unit in Hawaii and Australia gave the date, place and time of the impending Japanese operation, as well as the composition of the Japanese forces. In addition, this intercept revealed that the attack on the Aleutians would be a diversionary at-

²⁹ Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway (New York, 1982), p. 17.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 45-46

³¹ U. S. Army, <u>Strategy and Command</u>. The First Two Years (Washington, 1985), p. 281.

³² Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against The Sun (New York, 1985), p. 168.

tack and also gave the position from which the attacks would be launched.³³ This error by the Japanese resulted from a failure to revise their naval code which had been scheduled to be changed on 1 April, and subsequently was postponed to 1 May and then to 1 June.³⁴

In keeping with Clausewitz's maxim that intelligence normally is false, there were many military men who postulated that this information was either manipulative communications deception or a disinformation campaign mounted by the Japanese. Nimitz, to his credit, silenced the critics when he stated, "Better to base one's strategy upon radio intelligence than upon nebulous what ifs."35

On the eve of the attack the crucial moment came when the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Layton, had to forecast and confirm the operational intelligence provided to him. On 28 May Nimitz asked Layton when the U.S. Fleet should expect to meet the enemy. Layton replied that the first contact with the enemy would be at 0600 Midway time on 4 June 1941 at 325 degrees Northwest at a distance of 175 miles from Midway. Historical records from the same source indicate that the first contact with the Japanese Fleet was at 0555 Midway time on 4 June 1941 at 320 degrees Northwest at a distance of 180 miles from Midway. Local air assets of the fleet and Midway were used to pinpoint and identify the Japanese Fleet which set the terms of battle.

At 0930 on 4 June 1942 the first American planes began to strike the Japanese Fleet. See Appendix C for a chronological view of the operational

³³ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 450.

³⁴ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 168

³⁵ Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway (New York, 1982), p. 73.

^{36 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 102.

intelligence indicators leading up to the decisive American victory at Midway.

Ardennes

The German offensive in December 1944, known as the Battle of the Bulge, is renowned both as a high point and a low point for the Allies in World War II. Charles B. MacDonald sums up the pertinent aspects of the campaign in this quote:

"...Adolf Hitler set in motion preparations for a battle that was to assume epic proportions, the greatest German attack in the West since the campaign of 1940 had brought down the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France in swift and ignominious defeat. It was destined to involve more than a million men and to precipitate an unparalleled crisis for the Allied armies. It was also to involve one of the most egregious failures in the history of American battlefield intelligence. Yet it was also due to become the greatest battle ever fought by the United States Army.37

As with the previously cited case studies numerous operational intelligence indicators were available to the commanders to warn of the impending crisis.

Again, political indicators played a prominent role. On 4 September 1944 the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, Baron Oshima, met with Hitler and was told that once a replinishment of German forces was completed a large-scale offensive would be conducted in the west sometime after 1 November. Oshima immediately reported this to Tokyo via diplomatic channels where-upon it was intercepted by MAGIC and passed to Washington. Follow-

³⁷ Charles B. MacDonald, <u>A Time For Trumpets</u> (New York, 1985), p. 11.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

ing this a meeting on 15 November between Oshima and Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, was conducted in which Oshima asked about the status of the operation. Ribbentrop replied that it still was planned, and even though Oshima initially discounted the capabilities of the Germans to conduct such an operation he passed this information along with his belief that it was possible to Tokyo. This exchange also was intercepted by MAGIC.³⁹

In addition to MAGIC intercepts in the Pacific area ULTRA was playing a key role in the European area. ULTRA provided numerous intelligence indicators for the command. Throughout the month of October 1944 the Allies knew that the Germans were removing Panzer units from the line. 40 This assembling of Panzer units was identified by Allied intelligence as the 5th Panzer Army but its mission had not been defined and the Allies believed that it was a mobile counterattack force to be used in the execution of the defense. 41

ULTRA also revealed the western movement of large numbers of German aircraft beginning on or about 8 November 1944. In addition, numerous urgent requests by Army Group B for aerial reconnaissance around the areas of Malmedy and Eupen to include crossings over the Meuse River in the vicinity of Liege, Namur, Dinant and Givet were intercepted. These urgent requests were repeated as late as the first week of December.

Besides the intercept indicators available there was a great deal of combat information available early and immediately prior to the opera-

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 48-49.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 62.

⁴¹ Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (Bloomington, 1981), p. 458.

⁴² Charles B. MacDonald, A Time For Trumpets (New York, 1985), p. 63.

^{43 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 66-67.

tion. Toward the end of November 1944 an order dated 30 October 1944 from the German 86th Corps was captured by Ninth Army which asked all German units to screen for soldiers with a knowledge of English, specifically the American dialect. This same order also asked for volunteers for a "special unit" that was to be used for special missions on the western front and directed that all captured U.S. equipment be gathered as "equipment of the above troops."

Immediately prior to the operation the combat intelligence indicators intensified. Extensive armor noise was heard during the evenings of 14 and 15 December in front of the U.S. 106th Division and the U.S. 28th Division. In addition, on 14 December a woman fleeing west from the Nazis told of the woods near Bitburg being jammed with troops, vehicles and bridging equipment. Her credibility was such that the unit which conducted the interregation forwarded the report to VIII Corps which passed it on to 1st Army. Also, two German POW's taken on 15 December told of fresh troops arriving constantly and that a large attack was expected to be made in a day or two. 46

The senior leadership of the Allies also expressed misgivings prior to the attack. Eisenhower had discussed his concerns with Bradley during the month of November after he found out there were up to eight additional German divisions opposite the Ardennes. Fradley, while disturbed by the VIII Corps front, discussed the situation with the VIII Corps commander, but

⁴⁴ <u>Ibid.,</u> p. 69.

^{45 &}lt;u>Ibid.,</u> pp. 12-14.

⁴⁶ Russell F. Weigley, <u>Eisenhower's Lieutenants</u> (Bloomington, 1981), pp. 449-451.

^{47 &}lt;u>Ibid., p. 458.</u>

dismissed the idea of realigning the front because in his mind no viable strategic objectives lay on the enemy's path out of the Ardennes. 48

The intelligence officers for the various commands also perceived that all was not as it seemed. Toward the end of November the ULTRA point of contact, Colonel Rosengarten, reminded 1st Army of the German offensive through the Ardennes in 1940 and noted that "desperate men are likely to take desperate measures."

The intelligence officer for SHAEF, General Strong, felt so adamantly about the validity of the operational intelligence indicators that he visited General Bradley the first week of December to express his concerns over an impending attack. Weigley goes on to state that Bradley told Strong he was aware of the potential problem and had in fact prepared a contingency plan with two divisions for just such an operation. History records that this was not the case.

The intelligence officer for the 12th Army Group, BG Sibert, was impressed enough with the data and the other indicators that he sent his deputy, Colonel Jackson, to SHAEF and then to London to see what else Jackson could find out.⁵¹

At 0530 on 16 December 1944 the German offensive in the Ardennes began. See Appendix D for a chronological view of the intelligence indicators culminating in the German attack.

IV. Analysis

⁴⁸ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 461.

⁴⁹ Charles B. MacDonald, A. Time For Trumpets (New York, 1985), p. 69.

⁵⁰ Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (Bloomington, 1981), p. 461.

⁵¹ Charles B. MacDonald, A Time For Trumpets (New York, 1985), p. 71

The purpose of the previous discussion was to provide historical evidence that intelligence indicators were present in the three case studies that should have allowed the operational commanders to identify and understand the enemy intent and probable course of action. These indicators were not all operational in scope as they were also from the tactical and strategic arenas. However, every indicator discussed earlier was available to the operational commander. If it is accepted that Midway was an operational intelligence success and Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes were operational intelligence failures, then the primary question of this paper becomes evident. What factors led to the acceptance of intelligence and the contribution to the operational success at Midway and what factors caused the rejection of intelligence and lack of operational success at Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes? Put another way, if intelligence is available and evaluated properly are there reasons or factors that would preclude this intelligence from contributing to the overall success of the campaign?

Before analyzing the alleged intelligence failures of Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes the paper will examine the question of why intelligence contributed to the operational success at Midway.

As shown by the indicators listed in Appendix C a plethora of information and analysis was present upon which to base an operational plan. The first point that becomes evident is that intelligence is worthless unless decision makers and military leaders accept it and act upon it. This was certainly the case in this instance and credit for the decisiveness must go to Admiral Nimitz. Gordon Prange's explanation of Nimitz's approach to intelligence is revealing:

"Nimitz's concept of intelligence was dynamic: Facts were high grade ore to be sifted carefully, the pure metal of knowledge extracted and forged into a weapon to defeat

the enemy. 52

Admiral Spruance goes on to state in an interview with Prange:

The credit must be given to Nimitz....Not only did he accept the intelligence picture but he acted upon it at once. 53

A review of the case study shows that the operational commanders felt that the Japanese would attack and they accepted the intelligence that stated the target would be Midway vice other targets in the Pacific.

Why did Nimitz accept the intelligence reports and analysis at face value and base an operational battle on such? Is he any better an operational commander than Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor or Eisenhower and Bradley in the Ardennes? It is too simplistic in this author's opinion for the answer to be yes. Further analysis will reveal the shortcomings that the commanders at Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes had to cope with.

The argument can be made that Nimitz was a "genius" because he discerned when no one else was able to. Clausewitz defines "genius" in the following way:

"...survey all those gifts of mind and temperment that in combination bear on military activity. These, taken together, constitute the essence of military genius...it is precisely the essence of military genius that it does not consist in a single appropriate gift....Genius consists in a harmonious combination of elements, in which...none may be in conflict with the rest." 54

While the question of Nimitz's genius raises some interesting thoughts it is not a subject for this paper. It is more a case that he did not suffer from the systemic and intrinsic shortcomings which exacerbated the operational failures of Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes. These shortcomings were in evidence in varying degrees for each of the alleged operational intelligence

⁵² Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway (New York, 1932), p. 384.

^{53 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 393.

⁵⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, 1976), p. 100.

failures and it is these shortcomings on which this analysis will focus. For every shortcoming noted regarding Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes it is to the operational commanders' credit that they were not allowed to be replicated prior to Midway.

The first shortcoming that becomes readily apparent from the case studies is that most leaders and commanders wish for too much information or intelligence.

Roberta Wohlstetter has written extensively on this subject regarding Pearl Harbor while Charles B. MacDonald alludes to it regarding the Ardennes. The argument presented by these authors is that the decision makers were deluged with information or "signals" making it almost impossible to ignore those signals which were misleading, false or that just didn't apply to the subsequent operation. These signals are referred to by Wohlstetter as "noise." Therefore, the decision makers continually were trying to sift the "signal" from the "noise." This certainly was the case with our leaders in Washington and Honolulu and to some extent with Eisenhower and Bradley in the Ardennes. History indicates that this was one of the primary factors regarding the surprise at Pearl Harbor. The competition between the signals indicating a possible attack on Pearl Harbor were immersed in the noise offered by the intelligence regarding a Japanese attack toward Russia or Australia or expectations of local sabotage. The same argument holds for the Allied reading of the mission for the 6th Panzer Army as a defensive counterattack force with a mission vicinity Cologne. Just as this situation was helped by German deception it must be expected that noise will always lead to the inevitable ambiguity that presents itself in all conflicts. However, within this problem is a facet of another shortcoming which demonstrates the linkage among the reasons operational intelligence may or may not be

accepted. Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes serve as <u>prima facie</u> evidence that there is a tendency by operational commanders to accept and "cull" that information which substantiates a particular stand. This shortcoming will be referred to as the "preconceived idea" syndrome.

Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes serve as excellent examples of the farreaching effects that the inability to maintain freedom of action in one's
thinking can lead to. Both operations serve as examples of ignoring reliable
and repeated intelligence warning indicators because of a rigid belief that
events would occur in another manner. In both cases there was a clear and
gross underestimation of the Japanese and German potential and willingness
not only to execute such operations but also in their taking such risk. This
refusal by decision makers and the operational commanders to adapt their
thoughts to the intelligence with which they were presented was paramount
in causing defeat. For these leaders who had access to the myriad of
intelligence indicators the possibility of a Pearl Harbor or an Ardennes
seemed too risky for them to take seriously. Once they judged it too risky
then it is this author's opinion that the leaders classified the possibilities as
impossible.

An interesting theme on the subject of preconceived ideas has been developed by Klaus Knorr. His theme is developed through a concept referred to as "behavioral surprise". This "occurs when the opponent's behavior is incompatible, or seems to be incompatible, with our set of expectations. It occurs when (a) the opponent acts highly irrationally or with unexpected irrationality, (b) when intelligence is based more on stereotypes than objective perceptions, and (c) when an opponent's behavior is altered due to lead-

ership or other important changes and our expectations, though previously correct, do not recognize the shift. 55 A case can be made for all three circumstances above utilizing the case studies of Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes.

Another facet of this syndrome of preconceived ideas is the great reluctance by leaders to orient away from an intelligence estimate once it has been adopted. Additionally, further intelligence may not be accepted because the leaders have too closely aligned themselves with a particular estimate. This is certainly evident at the strategic level regarding Pearl Harbor and in Bradley at the operational level in the Ardennes campaign.

In both instances the leaders on the ground saw what they wanted to see.

Wohlstetter phrased this phenomenon best when she stated:

"how hard it is to hear a signal against the prevailing noise, in particular when you are listening for the wrong signal, and even when you have a wealth of information." 56

It is incumbent that all information and intelligence received be allowed to leave room for legitimate differences of interpretation. This was not the case at Pearl Harbor or the Ardennes, thus enemy courses of action other than the ones the leaders and principal analysts thought likely were not allowed to be developed.

The third shortcoming that was evident at Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes was inappropriate overconfidence on the part of military leaders. This aura permeated all levels of political and military leadership. Confidence, when focused properly, can be a strong tool to be used by leaders at all levels. However, when overconfidence or bias is allowed to manifest

⁵⁵ Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," <u>World Politics</u>, Vol. XVI, Apr. 1964, pp. 462-463.
56 Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Vol. 43, Jul. 1965, p. 691.

itself and direct all thinking then it is not a useful tool as these two case studies exemplify. The English historian Trevelyan said that bias is a thing not necessarily good or bad; in any case it is inevitable.⁵⁷ The question for leaders is when does overconfidence or bias become permissible and when must it be tempered so as not to distort facts and analysis?

The overconfidence factor evident at Pearl Harbor was both systemic and intrinsic. As Walter Laqueur stated:

The idea that a small and industrially backward country like Japan would dare to attack mighty America seemed so strange and outlandish that the President and the military leadership were disinclined to attribute much importance to information about an impending attack. 58

The systemic component of this argument revolves around the recognition of the strategic inanity of an attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was this overconfidence or bias that created the disbelief that such an event would occur. The intrinsic component of the argument is evidenced by the Western culture's view of the Japanese. Fletcher Pratt, in *Sea Power and Today's War*, argued that the Japanese were inferior aviators because they were near-sighted and their sense of balance was affected by a faulty inner ear ⁵⁹. Geoffrey Till states that the British naval attache in Tokyo reported to London that the "slow brains" of the Japanese caused them not to accept new ideas and therefore they were unable to stay current with technological innovations ⁶⁰. Throughout history this feeling of superiority by one culture

⁵⁷ G.M. Trevelyan, "Bias in History," <u>History</u>, 32, no. 115 (March, 1947) pp. 1-15.

⁵⁸ Walter Laqueur, A World Of Secrets (New York, 1985), p. 257.

⁵⁹ <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 382.

Geoffrey Till, "Perceptions of Naval Power Between the Wars: The British Case," <u>Estimating Foreign Military Power</u> (London, 1982), p. 187.

over another has caused operational setbacks because one side underestimated the ability of the other to make war.

Overconfidence also affected the Allied view prior to the Ardennes. As of late August both Eisenhower and his G-2, Major General Strong, believed that the Germans were defeated and it was only a matter of time before the war would be over.⁶¹ In the case of the Ardennes the leadership was biased against any ability the Germans had to thwart the American offensive. As Walter Bedell Smith would phrase it later, "a dying gasp. No Goddamned fool would do it."⁶²

A fourth shortcoming that appears is best characterized as the commander's eternal quest for certainty. This desire for certainty is certainly understandable given the nature of war. In war one deals with the ultimate reality of life and death in the conduct of operations, hence there is and always will be a desire for certainty. A tangent to this shortcoming applies only to the Pearl Harbor example.

Part of the reason that Pearl Harbor occurred was because the political and military leaders at both the operational and strategic level did not want to react to the Intelligence and Warning indicators that were presented to them. The reason for this was because any reaction would be construed as escalatory, moving us closer to war and away from peace. Therefore, the reaction to indicators or the problem of warning becomes inseparable from the problem of decision and execution. It is part of our national psyche that the more drastic or escalatory the required response, the greater the certainty we desire.

An additional part of the certainty perspective revolves around our

⁶¹ Charles B. MacDonald, A Time For Trumpets (New York, 1985), p. 51.

⁶² Ibid., p. 78.

mechanism for attaining a degree of certainty. In both case studies the operational leaders attempted to reach certainty through consensus building. There was not one decision maker or leader involved in Pearl Harbor or the Ardennes that possessed "coup d'oeil." "Coup d'oeil" is defined as "understanding, which in this dense darkness is never without a gleam of inner light to lead us to the truth. "63" Not one decision maker, at any level, had the ability to look beyond the systemic and intrinsic problems present and see what was about to happen. Hence, the tendency among leaders was to confuse that which they didn't understand with the improbable.

Another shortcoming that played a role in intelligence and its contribution to operational success would be what this author refers to as the "wolf" theory. As with the tale of the young shepherd who cried wolf once too often, the leaders at Pearl Harbor had been innundated with reports of an impending attack since as early as January, 1941. All of these previous false alarms and alerts only tended to dull the thought processes when the moment of decision arrived. Based on the historical evidence available, the "wolf" theory is not firmly applicable to the Ardennes. However, the implications and effects of this theory merit its mention in this analysis so that future leaders and analysts will be cognizant of it and its ramifications.

The last shortcoming appearing from an analysis of these case studies is the systemic problems found not only in the intelligence system at the time of Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes but also present today. There was in both cases a decided lack of ability to collate intelligence from all sources to include the full spectrum of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence. Ad-

⁶³ Major General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personaliity in War (Carlisle Barracks, 1983), p. 102.

ditionally, just as a commander must be resolute in his conduct of operations, so too must the intelligence officer. Intelligence personnel must be aggressive and forceful enough to stand by their estimates when postulating enemy intentions. It is a matter of conjecture, but an interesting argument can be extrapolated as to the outcome of the Ardennes if Colonel Dickson had been more dogmatic in his belief about a German attack. However, Dickson is not alone in his culpability regarding this facet of the discussion. Intelligence officers above his level must share equally in the blame. This lack of aggressiveness and unvillingness to argue one's convictions must not be a trademark of the intelligence corps today. The degree to which operational commanders had access to ULTRA and MAGIC should be noted at this time as this bears on their ability to confirm other intelligence indicators. At the time of Pearl Harbor the MAGIC system and its intercepts were safeguarded and, in fact, no intelligence or indicators regarding its intercepts were forwarded either to General Short or to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor 64 This shortcoming impacts heavily on the systemic problem for intelligence as it can be reasonably argued that the political intelligence indicators prior to Pearl Harbor were strategic and not operational in nature. However, it is the feeling of this author that these political indicators fall in the nexus between tactical and strategic intelligence, which is operational intelligence, and that this type of intelligence may well provide the key to the enemy commander's mind. The ability to focus on and understand the enemy commander's mind must become one of the primary facets of operational intelligence. The dissemination criteria on ULTRA reveal the same shortcoming. In late 1944 ULTRA intelligence, in varying degrees of detail, was being made available

⁶⁴ Hans L. Trefousse, <u>Pearl Harbor</u>: <u>The Continuing Controversy</u> (Malabar, 1982), p. 35.

down to Army level, but not corps. 65 This indicates that while Hodges may have had some indication of possible attack, his corps commanders had to depend on other sources as indicators could not even be referenced in the daily intelligence traffic from higher to lower.

V. Conclusions

There are many pieces that eventually comprise the puzzle of operational success. Clausewitz stated it best regarding intelligence:

This difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war, by making things appear entirely different from what one had expected."66

If engagements and battles are to be sequenced and linked to produce a victorious end state then operational intelligence must contribute, but more importantly, it must be given the opportunity to contribute.

This paper has identified six shortcomings that caused intelligence indicators not to be acted upon. These are:

- -too much intelligence or the "noise" theory.
- -preconceived ideas.
- -overconfidence.
- -desire for certainty.
- -"wolf" theory.
- -systemic and intrinsic problems of intelligence system.

While this paper has concentrated on the case studies of Pearl Harbor, Midway and the Ardennes it is plausible to conclude that these deficiencies could occur again given the right setting and mentality. As the shortcomings

⁶⁵ Charles B. MacDonald, A Time For Trumpets (New York, 1985), p. 60.

⁶⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, 1976), p. 117.

are both systemic and intrinsic in some cases then the requirement to prevent their recurence is paramount in campaign planning. These faults were not evident at Midway. Midway was considered an operational success while Pearl Harbor and the initial stages of the Ardennes were not. It is incumbent on decision makers and military leaders that the lessons of the past serve as a polestar for future operations. All elements of an organization must work in harmony for success to be realized.

As mentioned earlier, the shortcomings identified by the analysis are in some cases systemic and in others intrinsic, or both. The primary point that repeats itself thoughout the case studies is the interrelationship among the deficiencies. If one fault is allowed to exist by analysts or decision makers, then it is probable that other shortcomings will not only manifest themselves but multiply the negative effect on any outcome. Decision makers and military leaders bear the heavy weight of responsibility in the future. They would do well to remember this thought by Clausewitz:

"Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act. Hence the step is always long from cognition to volition, from knowledge to ability....(Man) derives his most vigorous support, if we may use the term, from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, stauchness, and strength of character." 67

Generally, operational intelligence provides the commander with what is known or suspected about his enemy, with trends in his strength and capabilities, with insight regarding the enemy commanders intent, and with the intelligence officers best judgement of his enemy's plans and intentions. When the product presented to the commander is high in quality and adequate in the amount of detail required, the commander has greater free-


⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 112.

dom of action in his planning spectrum than he would otherwise have. When the shortcomings addressed within this paper are present or allowed to introduce themselves at some point in time during the analytical/decision phase, then even the best planned campaign can be undermined and possibly threatened with failure.

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Appendix A: Operational Intelligence Relationship to Tactical and Strategic Intelligence



Appendix B: Intelligence Indicators for Pearl Harbor

1940

27 Sep--Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan concluded.

1941

- 27 Jan--The U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, obtained and reported to the U.S. that Japan was planning a possible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
- 13 Apr--Japan signed a neutrality treaty with Russia. This effectively oriented her focus westward or to the south.
- 27 May -- President Roosevelt proclaimed an unlimited national emergency
- 2 Jul--Imperial Conference in Tokyo confirming her war plans.
- 24 Jul--Japanese troops occupied southern Indochina.
- 26 Jul--President Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the U.S., closed our ports and placed an embargo on certain goods.
- 30 Jul--U.S.S. Tutuila bombed in Chungking.
- 17 Aug--U.S. rejected Japanese request for a summit meeting.
- 6 Sep--Japan decided on war if agreement with the U.S. could not be reached by early October.
- 24 Sep--Tokyo instructed the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu to report on U.S. naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on a weekly basis.
- 16 Oct--Tojo became Prime Minister of Japan and formed a new cabinet.
 - --Stark warned Kimmel that Japanese aggression was likely and ordered "preparatory deployments."
- 3 Nov--Grew told Washington that conflict with Japan may come suddenly and dramatically.

- 17 Nov--Grew again warned Washington that Japan might strike suddenly and in any direction.
- 20 Nov--The "final" Japanese proposal was presented to the U.S.
- 22 Nov--U.S. intercepted a message telling negotiators that the deadline for the U.S. had been extended until 29 November, but no longer.
- 24 Nov--CNO warned Rimmel that a surprise movement by Japan was a possibility.
- 27 Nov--Roosevelt directed notification of Hawaiian commanders that further Japanese aggression was likely.
- 3 Dec--Navy intelligence reported Japanese codes being destroyed throughout the Far East.
- 6 Dec--U.S. intercepted a message by Japanese agents telling of the ability to surprise Hawaii.
 - --Roosevelt had 13 parts of 14 part message and felt that war would happen.
- 7 Dec--1100 EST: U.S. received 14th part of message which gave time of delivery.
 - --1215 EST: USS Ward sunk a Japanese submarine outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
 - --1325 EST: Japanese planes struck Pearl Harbor.

Appendix C: Intelligence Indicators For Midway

1942

- 10 May--U.S. knew a major Japanese attack was impending and initiated measures to identify location.
- 14 May--During this week cryptanalysts determined that Midway was the main target with the Aleutians as a diversionary attack.
- 25 May--Japan failed to change naval code and intercepts provided Nimitz with the date and time of the operation as well as the Japanese order of battle.
- 27 May--Japanese fleet could not be found by U.S.
- 28 May--Fleet Intelligence Officer informed Nimitz with information regarding his assessed first contact with the Japanese fleet.
- 3 Jun--Enemy fleet sighted and reported to Nimitz.

1944

- 4 Sep--MAGIC intercept revealed Japanese meeting with Hitler and planning of German large-scale offensive in the West after the 1st of November.
- Oct--ULTRA revealed Germans were pulling Panzer units off line.
- 8 Nov--ULTRA revealed the movement west of additional German aircraft.
- 15 Nov--MAGIC reported on a meeting between Japanese and Ribbentrop and Germans confirmed that the large-scale offensive was still on.
 - Nov--ULTRA SLU warned of "desperate gamble" by Germans.
- 1 Dec--SHAEF intelligence officer visited Bradley to voice concern over German intentions.
 - --ULTRA picked up numerous requests by Army Group B for aerial recon of Malmedy, Eupen, and for crossings of the Meuse River around Liege, Namur, Dinant and Givet. This message was repeated urgently on into December.
 - --The 12th Army Group Intelligence Officer sent his deputy to London for explanation of numerous intelligence indicators.
 - --Eisenhower expresses misgivings to Bradley as he learns there are 8 additional enemy divisions now opposite the Ardennes.
- 14 Dec--Combat intelligence report received of large number of German troops outside Bitburg.
 - --U.S. front line units report extensive armor noise to their front during hours of darkness and increased enemy patrolling.

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